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3
FROM DEMESNE TO WORLD-SYSTEM: A CRITICAL REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE ON THE TRANSITION FROM
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM
Robert S. DuPlessis
Although economic history has always been regarded as central
to the elaboration of a Marxist historiography, relatively
little of the radical work done in this country has been concerned with it. Many specific reasons help explain this
phenomenon—the neglect of economic history on the undergraduate level; the difficulty in obtaining primary sources
for anything outside American history; the severing of any
political dimension from the overwhelmingly quantitative
economic history which is in vogue; the openly reactionary
political and ideological goals of much of bourgeois economic
history (like the theory upon which it rests); the (largely
unconscious) acceptance of the prevailing hierarchy of historical studies. Among younger radical historians, this
remarkable ignorance of economic history also derives from
our genesis both as radicals and as historians. For we
came of age in a period marked not by economic but by political turmoil—from the Korean War and McCarthyism, through
civil rights and Vietnam, up to Watergate and its attendant
crisis of legitimacy—during which the capitalist economic
structure remained firm and prosperous. The context in which
we began our work, therefore, did not present us with economic
problems for which we would be stimulated to find the historical roots. Instead, we encountered political issues,
and developing an understanding of their origins promised
not simply greater knowledge in a scholarly sense but also
the possibility of changing them. Marx's injunction to himself and his heirs could best be fulfilled, it seemed, by
studies of a predominantly political and social cast.
Recently, however, interest in economic history has been
growing on the American left, evidence of the maturing of
Marxist scholarship as well as of the festering depression
of the past few years. More specifically, a good deal of
credit must go to Immanuel Wallerstein's The Modern WorldSystem. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Academic Press,
1974) . This book has captured the attention of radicals
for several reasons. First, it deals with a subject of
fundamental significance for both modern history and the
Marxist interpretation of that history, the transition from
feudalism to capitalism. But unlike previous studies of
the process, which have concentrated on its origins in
western Europe between the late fourteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Wallerstein's account locates the rise of capitalism in its world setting, exploring the ways in which
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European economic development depended on the subjection and
exploitation of other areas of the globe. Recognizing moreover, that there remains substantial disagreement regarding
the causes of this transformation, Wallerstein carefully surveys many of the important issues, discussing critically a
wide range of work by bourgeois and Marxist historians alike
while offering a new framework of analysis for the transition
and a new interpretation of it. Finally, one of the most
attractive and persuasive features of The Modern World-System
is the way Wallerstein places economic history in a political
context. He sees the evolution of the modern state and the
growth of capitalism as two sides of the same coin which can
only be understood if examined together.
In short, Wallerstein's book is of great importance to a comprehension of the transition from feudalism to capitalism—
even if, as I shall argue below, its thesis is deeply flawed
and its analyses often wrong. Its significance—and its
problems—can best be grasped by discussing it in light of
previous work on the transition. In this review, therefore,
I shall begin by summarizing the locus classicus, Marx's
definition of feudalism and capitalism and his scattered and
even contradictory comments about the causes and characteristics of the change from one to the other mode of production. I shall then turn to later studies and the debate
which arose concerning the correct interpretation of the
historical and theoretical material, before concluding with
a lengthy consideration of The Modern World-System.
I
For Marx, feudalism described a society in which a restricted
aristocracy of landlords ruled a mass of peasants. Because
the direct producers possessed the means of production, the
nobility could extract the surplus necessary to its maintenance only by coercion—originally armed force or the threat
of it, later supplemented by custom, courts and ideologicalreligious institutions. The surplus might be rendered by
labor services on the demesne or by monetary payments; in any
event, producers were unfree in the sense that they gave
personal tribute to overlords. The political structure controlled the economic in this mode of production; that is to
say, relations of political dominance allowed the economic
surplus to be taken by the non-producing aristocracy. As a
result both of these coercive relations of production and
of the fact that the bulk of production was for immediate
use by the producing and appropriating classes, the forces
of production remained underdeveloped in feudalism: the
division of labor was relatively primitive and thus productivity was low.l
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Under capitalism, of course, everything is altered. A
propertyless proletariat works but no longer controls the
means of production, ownership of which now resides in the
dominant class of capitalists. Workers can survive only by
selling their labor power and getting in return a money wage
with which they must purchase everything they need. The
economic surplus is appropriated not by forcing producers to
render service or payments but by paying them less in wages
than the value in the market of the commodities they make,
with the difference taken by the capitalist. Hence exchangevalue rather than use-value is the goal of production; even
labor power has become a commodity which is bought and sold.
In contrast with feudalism, economic relations are paramount
throughout society; moreover, they are contractual relations
without a hint of customary or personal obligation. The expropriation of the direct producers, who as a result must
constantly enter the market, promotes the development of
productive forces—an extensive division of labor, much
greater productivity, technical progress. In this way, demand is created and then supplied in ways which maximize
capital accumulation in the hands of the capitalist class,
at the same time that the subordinate condition of the
proletariat is continually reproduced.
The utter transformation of the relations and forces of production is, of course, the end result of a complex and interdependent series of partial changes. An initial stock of
capital must be assembled and concentrated in the hands of
those willing and able to invest it productively, rather
than consume it. Not only must industry become the most
important sector of the economy—which entails the supercession of the simple (or petty) commodity production of
handicrafts—but agriculture must improve qualitatively and
release labor, resources and capital to the industrial sector. The market has to develop as the instrument of exchange, resource allocation and pricing. Both as cause and
consequence of the above, towns are converted from peripheral to central social units, geographical and social mobility increases, and new classes arise and replace the old.
The structure of law and convention which organized and protected the previous mode of production must be dismantled
and replaced.
These, then, are the historical developments which must be
explained if we are to understand the transition. Marx,
himself, however, never elaborated a coherent analysis of
the internal dynamics of feudalism, nor did he give much of
an account of the actual events which occurred during the
transformation. But he did contribute a number of insights
concerning those material factors which he took to be
necessary for the collapse of feudalism and the triumph
of capitalism. Before the well-known section in Volume I
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of Capital (part VIII on primitive or original accumulation) and the less famous chapters in volume III (ch. XX,
XXXVI and XLVII)—to which I shall return shortly—Marx had
written on the subject in The German Ideology and the Grundrisse. The relevant passages from the early works, along
with additional documentation, can be found in the anthology
Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (International Publishers,
19 6 5), edited with a fine introduction by Eric Hobsbawm.
When he first considered the transition, Marx paid little
attention to the countryside under feudalism. Apparently
feeling that feudalism was both too strong and too stagnant
to collapse from within, Marx (as Hobsbawm notes) postulated
only one task for the rural world, the liberation of its
residents from the traditional constraints of serfdom and
personal obligations when they were needed to form capitalism's workforce.2 As Marx put it, the conditions obtaining
under serfdom, when "the laborers themselves, the living
units of labor power, are still a direct part of the objective conditions of production and are appropriated as
such...,"^ must be broken. This differentiation, accomplished historically by the flight of serfs into towns, by
the end of villeinage, and by lords discharging their retainers, gave rise to free labor, that is to say, to labor
power which its possessors had to sell as a commodity in
the market. Much later, Engels came to see that the "relations between lords and dependent peasants" under feudalism had strongly affected its evolution, but Engels never
wrote about the subject in any detail.^
For his part, Marx always emphasized the role of the city,
which he saw as basically external and antagonistic to the
feudal system. The town was the home of commercial and
handicraft activities which at one and the same time undermined feudalism and created the preconditions for the new
capitalist mode of production. Engaged in the production
and exchange of commodities, merchants and craftsmen promoted trade, first local and then over increasingly long
distances. All of this fostered first, the accumulation
of monetary wealth; second, the division of labor—between
town and country (thereby undermining the primacy of landed
property), among the various types and stages of production,
between production and commerce, and eventually between
towns, third, the development of sophisticated market mechanisms; and finally, the emergence of the bourgeoisie. Because its interests could not be realized under feudalism,
this new class was eager for change; because of its ascendancy over the urban economy, it could effectively discharge
its mission. Once the restrictions and protections erected
around simple commodity production by gild and municipal
authorities could safely be disregarded or even destroyed,
resources previously acquired through trade, usury, production or even hoarding were employed as capital. By means
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of capital, artisans and peasants were expropriated, free
labor power purchased, means of production amassed. The
modern proletariat joined the bourgeoisie as the leading
social classes, as pre-existing classes were broken down
and reconstituted. "Capital unites the masses of hands and
instruments which are already there."5 Without spelling out
how their effects operated, Marx mentioned "the extension of
commerce" in the 16th century and the diverse forms of state
aid usually called mercantilism,6 with the implication that
both were necessary for the transition to be completed successfully.
These are stimulating propositions, but they remained very
sketchy in the early works. In Capital, Marx expanded on
some of them, notably primitive accumulation. He discussed
both aspects of the process at some length: concentration—
the amassing of capital in a few hands—and expropriation-the separation of direct producers from the means of production. As in his previous writings, Marx recognized that
monetary wealth alone could not bring about the transition
to capitalism (hence merchants were at best proto-capitalists
as long as they simply made profits by selling scarce goods
turned out by the existing mode of production); capital had
to seize hold of production and transform it. Now he suggested that this had happened in two ways. Either merchants
--the major possessors of capital both under feudalism and
in conditions of original accumulation--had taken over the
commercial functions of artisans, thereby subordinating
them through "putting-out" or the domestic system, and
eventually turning them into Wage-earners, dispossessed of
their tools. Or artisans had managed to accumulate a little
capital, hire workers and branch out into trade, eventually
building up large workshops.
This latter way, argued Marx, was the most revolutionary, for
not only were artisans subordinated to capital, but the entrepreneur was stimulated to remake production—combining
stages, modifying the division of labor, and finally introducing new technical procedures—all in order to capture
more of the market. The merchant capitalist, on the contrary, was satisfied to leave productive methods largely
untouched, since his profits came from monopolies a and other
restrictive means which kept output down and profits per unit
up. Also in connection with original accumulation, Marx made
more specific the way in which money had acted as a solvent
of feudalism in the countryside through the medium of money
rents. These, which in western Europe had increasingly replaced labor services as the Middle Ages drew to a close,
had hastened the stratification of the populace, enabling
wealthier and luckier peasants to stockpile resources while
their hapless neighbors fell behind and were despoiled.
Thus in country as in city, labor power and the means of

production became commodities which could be acquired by the
restricted group which was coincidentally accumulating money
capital.
Marx also amplified somewhat his account of the collapse of
feudalism. In Capital, Vol. I, where he focused on the gathering and deploying of capital, he reiterated his hypothesis
that since capitalism is a system of commodity production and
exchange, then trade—the circulation of commodities—must
have been a crucial factor in breaking down the previous mode
of production. In particular, the development of the world
market aided the triumph of capitalism by promoting a wider
division of labor and manufactures independent of gilds and
towns. State power, which created a "systematical combination" of colonies, national debts, taxation, and "mercantilist" systems of protection, also played a role in capitalist
development. But Marx insisted that force could only "hasten,
hothouse fashion, the process of transformation...;" it did
not set the process going in the first place.
Later in
volume III, he qualified this stress, noting that the effects
of commerce on the feudal order hinged on the nature of that
order when trade developed. Specifically, feudalism has been
modified by peasant struggles over the relative share of the
surplus which they were to retain or the lord was to preempt.
This never-ending contest did serve to weaken the position
of the nobility, making it impossible for the old forms of
surplus appropriation to continue. Yet in the long run it
proved even more harmful to the mass of the peasantry than
to the aristocracy. For the replacement of serfdom by
monetarized relations opened the way for the creation of
capital and the dissolution of the traditional agrarian community of petty producers.
In his brief but pregnant observations, Marx raised the central issues regarding the transition from one mode of production to another. He laid great weight on the concurrent
processes of expropriation and concentration which not
merely eroded the relations of production and appropriation
obtaining under feudalism but provided some of the critical
preconditions of capitalism. To account for the change, he
pointed to the interaction of several new circumstances:
greatly expanded commercial capital in the hands of an enterprising bourgeoisie, the freeing of simple commodity
production from old restraints so that it might work for and
be modified by the world market, social polarization and
class formation, the conduct of the growing central state.
Notwithstanding the value—heuristic as much as substantive
— o f Marx's comments, like all partial analyses they raised
as many questions as they answered. This was even more the
case because what he did write seemed to suggest that
feudalism required external causes—urban and commercial
developments—in order to be transformed and he played down
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the contradictions internal to that mode of production, a
departure from his usual interpretation of historical change.
This difficulty may have come from his treatment of feudalism
as a generally monolithic and static whole, as well as from
the inadequate empirical studies on which he had to rely.
Because its inner dynamics were virtually ignored, not only
were shifts in class relations slighted but the place of towns
and their craftsmen and merchants within feudalism was viewed
as considerably more extrinsic than was in fact the case. As
a further result, the complexity of the transition period and
its various outcomes was underestimated and the evolution of
industry inadequately explained. This tendency was reinforced
by heavy reliance on materials pertaining to England, whose
experiences during the transition differed quite a bit from
other nations'. Finally, apart from a few sentences on the
world market, Marx remained resolutely Euro-centric. In
short, his suggestions needed to be fleshed out and tested
in two dimensions, the historical and the theoretical.
II
Although some work was done during the intervening decades,
the first extended Marxist survey and analysis of the transition problem in the English language was Maurice Dobb's
Studies in the Development of Capitalism (1946; revised
edition, 1963). Despite its limitations, which I shall
address presently, the book has stood the test of time
remarkably well and can still be recommended as the best
introduction to the topic. Like Marx, Dobb concentrated
on England, with some attention devoted to France and the
Low Countries. Nonetheless, he read widely and critically
in the existing literature and consciously raised thorny
problems of interpretation even when the answers he furnished were less than satisfactory.
Dobb defined feudalism as a mode of production "virtually
identical" with serfdom: "an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his own volition to
fulfill certain economic demands of an overlord."8 It differed from slavery in that the direct producer was "in
possession" of the means of production, and from capitalism in that s/he was not free in relations with the employer.
Taking a hint from Marx's statement that "what new mode of
production will take the place of the old does not depend
on commerce but on the character of the old mode of *production itself,"9 Dobb broke new ground in explaining the
eventual decay of feudalism. In contrast to those who
held that trade was the major solvent of the old order—
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a position which, as we have seen, can be traced right back
to Marx's writings—Dobb showed that the growth of commerce
and the consequent emergence of an economy based on money
frequently led to harsher rather than decadent serfdom; that
commodities could easily be produced for sale in the market
by other types of labor than wage-labor; and that the divergent outcomes cannot be understood only by reference to
external factors like trade. In other words, the decline
of feudalism—like change in or from every other mode of
production—had to be accounted for primarily by contradictions internal to it. And for Dobb, the central contradiction of feudalism lay in its "inefficiency ... as a system
of production, coupled with the growing needs of the ruling
class for revenue ... [which] promoted an increase in the
pressure on the producer to a point where this pressure
became literally unendurable" (p. 42).
The questions naturally arise, why did the ruling class
require more income and why could these demands no longer
be met? Dobb suggests growth in the numbers and expenditures of lords and vassals, coupled with an increase in
war and brigandage. While such impositions could initially
be met by demographic growth among the producers and by the
opening of new land, this was no longer possible when after
1300 population declined drastically, largely due to exhaustion induced by ever-rising exactions. Crisis and
revolt ensued throughout Europe.
By pointing to the contradiction set up between inherently
coercive relations of production and changing forms and degrees of exploitation, Dobb contributed substantially to our
understanding of the evolution and history of feudalism itself. He also clarified the origins of the breakdown of
this mode of production by showing that Europe passed through
a sustained crisis during the 14th and 15th centuries—that
is to say, before the world market had any impact. Besides,
he recognized that the results of this experience were extremely varied, and he constructed a brief typology of
agrarian development. Eastern European lords, he observed,
succeeded in reintroducing serfdom in order to obtain sufficient labor to work their estates, but in the west impressive concessions which struck at the foundations of
feudalism (commutation of labor services into money payments, lightening of all obligations) had to be granted to
the peasantry in return for their staying on the land.
What factors accounted for the different effects of the same
general economic forces? While continuing to insist on the
primacy of internal causes, Dobb explicitly rejected all
claims for the primacy of politics. To be sure, peasant
resistance,aristocratic
power and royal authority influenced the upshot of the crisis, which was fought out largely
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in political terms and in the political arena. The basic
causes were, however, economic: the existing type of cultivation (labor-intensive arable or pasture) and, more important still, the abundance or scarcity—and thus cheapness
or dearness--of hired labor. Lately, the first proposition
has been getting a good deal of attention, particularly as
it refers to the early period of capitalism,10 a n d it is
becoming accepted that types of cultivation, rooted in the
physical geography of different regions, at least established limits to the range of possible evolution. The
specific agrarian structure arrived at in any given locality
was, nevertheless, by no means determined by physical circumstances; they created potentialities not certainties.
The second, and in Dobb's eyes more weighty, explanation
is somewhat surprising to encounter in his book. On the
one hand, it assumes the existence of a well-developed labor
market, an unlikely feature of a feudal economy defined by
an extensive web of coercive social relations and controls
on producers; on the other, it minimizes the role of human
agents in favor of the operation of an impersonal mechanism.
Following Marx's example, Dobb devoted a large part of the
Studies to the roles of commerce and towns (as the home of
merchants and craftsmen) in the transition. Here three
stages of development can be distinguished: 1) when towns
began to grow in size, wealth and complexity without altering the feudal mode of production; 2) when changes inside
towns promoted the emergence of proto-capitalist forms;
3) when the nascent bourgeoisie took control of and transformed production. In the first period, urban markets were
still "half servants of and half parasites upon the body of
feudal economy" (p. 71)—fostering the slow accumulation
of capital among merchants but at the same time nurturing
simple commodity production.
Only during the second stage—which took a long time to be
reached and completed and thus occurred at widely differing
times in different places—can the outlines of new economic
conditions be discerned. Now towns began to win their
autonomy from feudal overlords and evolve internally towards
a stratified class society in which a mercantile elite predominated on the basis of wealth gathered through monopoly
and plunder and protected by oligarchic control of gilds and
urban governments. Merchants further consolidated their
economic primacy as the home market expanded both in the
cities and in the country and as foreign trade grew. Simultaneously, the other element of the embryonic capitalist
bourgeoisie was emerging, formed of artisans who restricted
access to mastership, thereby concentrating production and
wealth in their own hands, and took over the buying and
selling of raw materials and finished goods from their
poorer fellows. However, as yet the bourgeoisie was ready
—nay, eager—to compromise with feudalism. Able to purchase
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upward mobility into the dominant classes, it accepted
traditional social values and political structures and continued to derive its profits from purveying small amounts
of scarce goods to the upper classes rather than bulk products
to the masses.
Although Dobb did not put it in such terms, the foregoing
phases were preliminary—they engendered proto-capitalist
elements but did not assure their triumph. The transition
properly speaking only materialized during the third stage,
when merchants established domestic systems and craftsmen
reorganized production outside gild confines. The former
acted because increasing competition lowered speculative
profits, the latter in order to take advantage of cheap
labor resulting from the wage-lag produced by rapid inflation during the 16th century. This, then, was the critical
phase. Yet it was not always successfully concluded: the
development of the new mode of production could be and was
balked. On the one hand, a "second serfdom" emerged in
eastern Europe, in which feudal lords used wholly dependent
labor to produce specialized agricultural commodities (principally grain) for sale to the West, thus entering into
capitalist exchange relations which concurrently strengthened feudal relations of production. On the other, in many
places artisans used political revolt and gild regulations
to resist the dominance of commercial capital.
More important was the attitude of the merchants themselves:
even when responsible for large putting-out arrangements,
they might continue to seek their fortunes—and therefore
make their investments—in trade and finance. For all these
reasons, the cities of Renaissance Italy and late medieval
Flanders and Germany never progressed beyond commercial
capitalism.H Thus Marx's perception that artisan-founded
manufactory was the really revolutionary source of the
capitalist mode of production was validated historically.
As the English experience showed, it was the entrepreneur
risen from the ranks of the producers who was forced to
carry through the transformation to its conclusion. In
the process, trading monopolies had to be swept aside and
the hegemony of merchant capital destroyed by means of
political action. Hence England's development as the first
capitalist nation was a direct consequence of her having
the first bourgeois revolution.
Beyond the rise of a capitalist class, the completion of the
transition depended on the dual process of original accumulation making all forms of capital, along with free labor
power, available to would-be entrepreneurs. Dobb devoted
separate chapters to the amassing of resources and the
growth of a proletariat. As he saw it, the acquisition and
concentration of capital involved both "the ownership of
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assets, and ... a transfer of ownership..." (p. 178) and took
place in two steps. 1) Purchase at low cost of "titles to
wealth" (debt claims, bullion, land) from the old ruling
class, aided by state banks and borrowing; from foreign
(essentially colonial) areas, through the policies of mercantilist commercial exploitation; and by the dispossession
of small peasant and artisanal producers. 2) Realization or
sale of these assets at higher prices in order to buy industrial equipment and labor power.
The emergence of the proletariat was the final ingredient in
the mix which yielded capitalism. It resulted in part from
the inherent instability of an economy of small producers—
whether rural or urban—once political and corporate protections were weakened or removed and monopoly, usury and
exclusiveness were allowed free rein. But as it also represented the other side of the coin of primitive accumulation, it could proceed only by dispossessing a multitude of
formerly autonomous producers. Because of these mutually
reinforcing trends, the birth of the capitalist bourgeoisie
necessarily meant the simultaneous birth of the proletariat.
Much of the history of 16th and 17th century Europe—inflation, political, social and religious revolt, boom and bust
can be understood as the violent working out of the dialectic accumulation/expropriation.
The industrial revolution carried out under capitalist auspices was, as it were, the synthesis, in which all the elements were fused together: unprecedented technical development was built on the new economic and social relations
engendered during the previous centuries. When the industrial revolution gave capitalism its own specific technique
in the form of the large mechanized factory, the transition
was finished.
Dobb's contributions to clarifying the transition were substantial. He provided an impressive amount of historical
material to corroborate many of Marx's central insights.
At the same time, he laid greater stress on the internal
evolution of feudalism in producing the contradictions
which led to its disintegration. Similarly, he constructed
a more dynamic and complex view of the transition. Not only
did he postulate several stages to the process, noting that
it could always be arrested or diverted, but he explained
the difficulties encountered in gathering together all the
necessary factors of production (labor, capital, land) in
the hands of an enterprising bourgeoisie. He gave particular attention to developments within crafts and the ways in
which industry did--or, in many cases, did not—grow out of
them. He urged the importance of political behavior in
influencing the course of economic history. Finally, his
concern for the variegated texture of the transformation led
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Dobb to emphasize the range of outcomes which emerged historically in the commercial and industrial spheres as well
as in the agrarian sector.

Ill
Studies in the Development of Capitalism presented controversial interpretations of a number of issues and left many
others unresolved. As a result, although given scant notice
by the bourgeois journals, it provoked a valuable debate
among Marxists, in the course of which several of his points
were clarified and others still needing attention were distinguished. The articles in which the discussion was conducted for the most part initially appeared in the pages of
Science and Society (1950, 1952, 1953). Supplemented by
additional pieces, and excellently introduced by Rodney
Hilton,12 they have now been collected under the title The
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (New Left Books/
Humanities Press, 1976) . -LJ A review of the key topics
raised in these articles enables us not only to see how
far Dobb's account can be accepted and where it must be
corrected, but indicates the present state of Marxist
scholarship concerning the transition.
As we have seen, the question of what set afoot the replacement of one mode of production by the other has been
problematic ever since Marx. Dobb came out firmly on the
side of an internal contradiction, the over-exploitation
of the labor force which triggered revolt. Paul Sweezy,
on the contrary, relying not only on Marx but on the wellknown historian Henri Pirenne, asserted that feudalism
was conservative and resistant to change, for in it production was for immediate use rather than exchange. Hence
something external--namely trade, which stimulated production for the market--was required to unleash the forces
which would transform it.
This position has been losing support ever since Marx's
time. For his part, Dobb defended his interpretation
by reformulating it. He continued to maintain that because feudalism was a mode of production defined by
coercive extraction of the surplus, "the basic conflict"
was "between the direct producers and their feudal overlords who made exactions of their surplus labour-time or
surplus product by dint of feudal right and fedual
power." The end of the specific form of feudal exploitation came therefore, as a result of the "revolt among the
petty producers" (Dobb in Transition, p. 166). flowever,
peasant struggle did not lead directly to capitalism.
Father, it modified the dependence of petty producers on
feudal overlordship and allowed the growth of social
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differentiation among them. Eventually, after the drawn-out
but thorough processes of primitive accumulation had done
their work, capitalism was born. To be sure, this internal
conflict interacted with trade. Yet however much commerce
stimulated capital accumulation, commodity production and
social stratification, it remained a secondary contradiction.
Human agents at the point of production were necessary to
break the pattern of feudal domination and change the relations which underlay the mode of production. By their very
nature, exchange relations could not do this.
Kohachiro Takahashi, in his contribution to the debate, lent
theoretical support to Dobb by reaffirming the role of coercion in getting commodities produced under feudalism, as
against capitalism, where capital serves this mediating
function. Hilton, drawing on his own and others' work,
offered empirical backing to the same conclusions. He
argued that commerce helped to accumulate money in feudal
society but left petty-commodity production untouched. Some
dynamic within feudalism was necessary if merchants' money
were to be employable as capital. According to Hilton, the
force for change resided in the dialectic of pressure on
the part of the lord so he could maintain or improve the
political power which alone allowed him to extract the
surplus, and peasant opposition, which proved explosive
and victorious towards the end of the Middle Ages. Demographic circumstances (the pressure of population on resources) and the internal composition of peasant families
played a role in the outcome of the transition, but only
insofar as they stimulated or checked peasant revolt. Even
the fact that success in throwing off exploitation by the
feudal lord did not prevent a new yoke being imposed by a
landlord, capitalist farmer or entrepreneur does not negate
the primacy of struggle in unleashing the transformation.
Dobb's version of the transition has been modified in several respects. His twofold conception of original accumulation has been attacked by Sweezy as empirically untenable
—there is no evidence of the sales of assets hypothesized
in the second part nor any class which could have bought
them—and unnecessarily complicated, since in the first
stage the bourgeoisie had already acquired the things it
required in order to begin capitalist development. Other
commentators have agreed with this criticism and Dobb himself has largely abandoned the formulation, acknowledging
that his main point concerned the despoiling of laborers
who later formed a wage-earning class. The only sense in
which he has retained the second step is to denote a shift
in bourgeois investment from real estate, trade, usury and
so forth to means of production and labor.
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The depiction of feudalism before it entered into its prolonged
period of crisis has also come under fire for being too immobile. Takahashi insisted long ago that the peasantry had begun
to differentiate under serfdom, not merely after it had begun
to throw off feudal constraints, as Dobb believed. A more
comprehensive reevaluation is proposed by Hilton. As he
writes in his introduction to the Transition book, many bourgeois historians have narrowed the meaning of feudalism to
cover just vassals' holding of landed fiefs from lords to
whom they owed services, while Marxists continue to employ
it to signify an entire mode of production in which an "enforced transfer, either of surplus labor or of the product
of surplus labor" takes place (p. 14). This latter and more
comprehensive usage is justified, Hilton asserts, as long as
it is realized both that feudalism (including its labor form,
serfdom) was clothes in a variety of legal and institutional
dress, and that it was dynamic, evolving from at least the
ninth or tenth century and passing through a number of
stages, each marked by distinctive features and types of
social stratification. From an early date, serfdom began
to consist less of labor service than of money payments.
Now this change did not itself spell the doom of feudalism,
since coercive political relationships still underlay the
appropriation of the surplus. But it was important because
of what it set in motion: accumulation of money and other
resources by peasants, nobles, merchants, usurers and craftsmen; the tendency to treat all economic factors—including
labor--as commodities even when production remained petty in
scale and non-capitalist in structure; and disintegration
of the peasantry. Despite their somewhat different emphases,
these modifications all embody Dobb's central perception
that feudalism decayed due to internal causes, "not as the
result of the assault upon it of an incipient 'Capitalism'
in the guise of 'merchant capital' wedded to 'money economy'..." (Dobb in Transition, p. 100).
Along with greater appreciation of the fact that feudalism
was not a static closed agrarian system have come renewed
efforts to reinterpret the place of towns, crafts and commerce under feudalism and in the transition, specifically
the precise ways by which the city abetted the transformation of the country. Paul Sweezy elevated commerce to the
status of a primary cause: the rise of the urban-centered
market, which was fundamentally foreign to feudalism, nonetheless was necessary to change it. The market altered
production, he maintained, prompting greater specialization,
efficiency and division of labor, greater profits, emigration from the land. Rejecting these claims, Dobb pointed
out that the feudal economy was not self-sufficient and
thus needed trade which naturally stimulated production.
But, he reiterated, commerce under feudalism could only
encourage petty commodity production and was insufficient
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to alter the mode of production. Dobb's explanation, however,
still envisioned urban functions as essentially outside
feudalism, conceived of as an agrarian system, to which
crafts were peripheral. Interaction between city and
country was not functionally necessary and cannot help account for the onset of the transition.
In a recent article, included in the Transition volume, John
Merrington has reopened the subject on the basis of the argument that towns and their activities were intrinsic to
feudalism, not parasitic on it. Aided by monopolies regarding craft production and trade, he contends, productive
forces developed within the cities. Their favored position
—which they fought bitterly to maintain—permitted towns
to accumulate wealth siphoned off from the rural population.
Towns initially had a dynamic impact on feudal society; in
the long run, however, their effects were circumscribed by
reliance on exclusivism and restrictive practices for reproduction of the surplus. Instead of reorganizing their
methods of fabrication and widening the market, city merchants and artisans tried to cling to the gild restraints
and market limits of petty commodity production. Nevertheless, Merrington affirms, craftsmen and traders, like
peasants, could not avoid the process of internal differentiation born of the production and exchange of commodities even on the local level, much as corporate regulations
and municipal political institutions tried to hinder the
process. Thus the prerequisites for capitalism in the form
of human agents—prosperous merchants and craftsmen on the
one hand, ruined artisans on the other—and material requirements—capital and concentrated means of production—
were slowly generated in the urban interstices of the old
mode and as it were against its will, parallel to the
phenomena which Dobb had described in the countryside.
Yet these preconditions could actually serve as the elements of capitalist production only when the old restrictions had lost their hold, whether through circumvention
(e.g., ignroing gild rules or moving industry to the
countryside) or extension of the market beyond what the
cities could effectively control. The economic activities
conducted in and by the corporately-organized towns were
necessary for capitalism but were not its immediate
causes, Merrington has concluded, for in their structures
and goals they remained too much a part of the feudal
world.
Other questions remain to be settled. Despite Dobb's
attempt to give an historical basis to Marx's hypothesis
of two routes to capitalist reorganization of production
—mercantile and artisanal—explanations of the subject
are not very satisfactory. Dobb himself admitted that the
two paths are difficult to trace empirically. This is
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particularly true since many early capitalists were hybrid
merchant-manufacturers who carried out both production and
commerce. In addition, many early workshops look much like
putting-out arrangements. Marx's writings on thie point
are also not free from ambiguity. His reading of Capital
led Sweezy to deny that many entrepreneurs rose from the
ranks; on the contrary, he declared, large capitalist manufactories in new industries had been the most innovative
means from the very start. Merchant-run putting-out systems formed a slower, though feasible, way towards capitalist production, but enlarged craftsmen's workshops did
not. In response, Dobb stuck to his original contention
that small and parvenu types of merchant-manufacturers had
been the most important historically. In this he was
seconded by Takahashi, Hilton and Giuliano Procacci, although the latter felt that Dobb had erred by conflating
conservatively-managed putting-out controlled by merchants
with small artisan-directed domestic systems which were
the forerunners of capitalist factories. As Procacci admitted, however, there was simply not enough data to test
his (or anyone else's) propositions.
A quarter-century later, the matter has not been clarified
on either the theoretical or the factual level. Our understanding both of the handicraft production which was
carried on in towns and rural areas and of its evolution
falls far short of what we need. It seems to fit the definition neither of feudalism nor of capitalism. This being
so, what were its basic contradictions and how were they
mediated and resolved? Because our empirical knowledge has
advanced so little, the questions of what kind of capital
actually led to capitalism, who its agents were, and
whether it grew out of the gild economy or was a new creation remain undecided. Why the bourgeoisie changed from
parasitical on feudalism to modernizing and entrepreneurial
is obscure. According to Dobb, there was "a growth in the
resources of the small man ... [and] a gradual shift of attention away from purely speculative gains..." (Studies,
p. 126); but he does not really tell us why the new attitudes cropped up nor does he ground them in the political
and social history of the period. Takahashi adopts the
notion of a "capitalist spirit" from Max Weber; surely,
however, this puts the cart before the horse and fails to
reveal the reasons for the unequal distribution of the
new spirit between greedy merchants and usurers on the
one side and enterprising yeomen and small and medium
industrialists on the other. We still have few studies
about the social and professional origins of early entrepreneurs or about the organization and functioning of
their businesses. Even such mundane issues as the size
of units of production, the nature of the workforce and the
techniques involved are largely terra incognita.1^
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Due to its ubiquity, extensive division of labor and precocious class formation and conflict, the textile craft has
received much attention, probably too much. In fact, it
represents just one path to capitalism, that of industries
which were not capital-intensive and therefore allowed artisans to build up large shops with relative ease. As
Sweezy (and earlier Marx)15 indicated, only merchants and
landowners would have had the resources for buying labor,
materials and means of production on the scale required
for the new heavy industries such as mining, glassmaking,
brewing and shipbuilding. Georges Lefebvre suggested yet
another alternative, characterized by direct state aid to
merchants. Not only did governments seek to establish protected markets which would aid economic growth as well as
foster state power, but they gave grants to industry along
with huge military contracts which called forth mass production in order to fill them.16
Not surprisingly in view of all the issues which remain
open, the nature of the transition period itself continues
to be the subject of much debate, concerning particularly
the mode of production and the role of the state and politics during the process. Referring back to a number of
passages in Marx and Engels, Paul Sweezy proposed to treat
this as a distinct era in which pre-capitalist commodity
production had undermined feudalism but had not yet engendered a new mode of production. In his opinion, the
endemic struggles of the times were caused by the attempts
of several ruling classes—each based on a different type
of property—to seize control of the state which, by virtue
of the contest, was able for a long time to remain apart
from the fray and arbitrate it. Only when the bourgeoisie
took power (as in England after the civil wars during the
17th century) and acquired definitive ascendancy was the
triumph of capitalism assured.
Supported by Procacci, who stressed that merchant capitalism cannot define a mode of production because it focuses on exchange, Dobb objected to any explanation of the
transition as a separate intermediate period. Even though
petty production existed, it continued to do so as a part
of feudal society. As Procacci expressed it, feudalism was
the prevalent mode of production, albeit with capitalist
germs. While it frequently allied with merchants to do so,
the old feudal aristocracy managed to perpetuate its sway,
Dobb noted; thus this was a late form of feudal exploitation, though now occurring in a context of centralized
state power. In his book Lineages of the Absolutist State
(New Left Books/Humanities Press, 1974), Perry Anderson
comes to the same conclusion, finding that absolutism,
the political structure which developed in the course of
the transition, was "a redeployed and recharged apparatus
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of feudal domination" (p. 18) rather than the political form
of an intermediate mode.
To be sure, all participants in the controversy agree that
the old mode of production proved remarkably resilient. As
Hilton has insisted, this persistence of feudal structures
provided the economic foundation for the continuation of
traditional relations of domination and subordination.
Capitalism only prevailed when and where political revolution overthrew the ruling aristocracy.
Despite the confidence with which they are made, these
assertions far from settle these questions one way or the
other. Even a superficial consideration of the American
South before the Civil War or pre-industrial commodity
production in early modern Europe and the United States
will suffice to show that treating intermediate socioeconomic formations as wholly feudal or wholly capitalist
tends to obscure exactly what needs to be explained, the
transitional nature of the transition. The earlier suggestions of Marx and Engels were more nuanced than many
later and more extended analyses; they deserve to be
looked at anew for the insights they can provide for future
interpretations. Likewise, much remains unclear about the
political context of the transition. Take the early bourgeois revolutions. Did they represent the opening of the
way to capitalism by breaking the hegemony of feudal
classes? Or did they stand for the victory of capitalism,
which now had but to mature? How, in short, can they help
explain the transition? Also in need of reconsideration
is "normal" politics: that is, the constant negotiation
and quotidian struggle by which both the old consciousness
and the old order were slowly altered by the human beings
who accomplished—or prevented—the rise of capitalism.
IV
Two strategies for understanding the problem of the transition can be distinguished in the historical literature.17
The first entails intensive investigation of a city or
region over an extended period of time. While not unknown
in the English-speaking world, such studies are the specialty
of the informal school of historians associated with the
French journal Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations
and its predecessors. Notable examples are works by Pierre
Goubert, Beauvis et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1730, which may
be sampled in a synthetic article, "The French Peasantry in
the Seventeenth Century: A Reqional Example," Past and
Present, no. 10 (1956)^8 and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les
Paysans de Languedoc, a two-volume masterpiece now available
in an abridged translation (University of Illinois Press,
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1974)--though both can be adequately appreciated only by referring to the original texts with their extensive supporting
documentation. Other works which testify to the concerns of
historians working in this tradition include Pierre Deyon,
Etude sur la societe urbaine au 1 7 e siecle. Amiens, capitale
provinciale; Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine
au XVie siecle. Lyon et ses marchands (environs de 1520environs de 1580); Jean Jacguart, La crise rurale en Ile-deFrance (1550-1670); Robert Boutruche, La crise d'une socieTe.
Seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la Guerre de Cent
Ans. These scholars and their brethren are justly respected
for their comprehensiveness, imagination, precision, and use
of a wide range of sources to gather an enormous amount of
empirical data—something on which the performance of Marxist
historians has often been inadequate.
The interpretative framework which informs studies by Annales
school historians is that of modernization theory. Thus they
stress demography (which is seen as the basic factor affecting supply and demand and thereby the market), technological
development, urbanization, industrialization, and the transformation of "mentalites" or worldviews, especially the emergence of more "rational" attitudes. Conversely, they slight
not only class struggle but changes in the mode of production as well. In what is certainly the best work to have
emerged from this tradition, Le Roy Ladurie traces a great
agrarian cycle made up of recurrent Malthusian cycles: rising
standard of living, increasing population, pressure on and
parcellization of the land, subsistence crisis, population
decline, renewed equilibrium and the recommencement of the
same round, broken finally by the introduction of new crops
and technology. Why these latter were ultimately adopted
is not entirely clear but seems to rest on a changed outlook, the source of which is obscure. In short, these
studies have much less to say about the general issue of the
transition as Marxists define it than about specific aspects
of it.
The other strategy involves rethinking the entire process,
often from a Marxist perspective. The most exciting work
in this field, as in the Annales-inspired studies from which
much data is drawn, has occurred in agrarian history, whether
to make up for earlier neglect or because of the growing
awareness of the central importance of rural experience for
any revolutionary transformation.
In a recently published
article,-^ Robert Brenner argues against the view that the
transition can be interpreted by purely economic forces and
gives a cogent critique of the prevalent demographic and
commercial models. He maintains that these are of secondary
consequence. Building on but extending Dobb and Hilton's
thesis about the breakdown of feudalism, Brenner contends
that "it is the structure of class relations, of class power,
which will determine the manner and degree to which particu-

23
lar demographic and commercial changes will affect long-run
trends in the distribution of income and economic growth--and
not vice versa" (p. 31), and he shows that only in this way
can divergent outcomes be explained.
In eastern Europe, a low level of rural solidarity and struggle allowed the seigneurial reaction of the late Middle Ages
to be victorious to such a degree that landlords felt no compulsion to pursue improvements. As a further result of renewed aristocratic hegemony, only a small home market and
industrial labor force came into existence, further shortcutting the possiblity of either capitalism or industrialization. In western Europe, on the contrary, peasant resistance was much more effective, and it precluded the reimposition of serfdom. Yet in England, landlords in partnership with entrepreneurial-minded tenants eventually were
able to retain control of agriculture, setting the stage
for capitalist farming and, ultimately, self-sustaining
industrial advance. Rather different was the upshot of
successful peasant defiance in France, where it was associated with the evolution of "absolute" monarchy. With
this backing, the peasantry was able to block capitalist
reorganization of farming but—since the state intended
to curb though not to smash the aristocracy—could not
achieve a decisive victory on its own terms. Thus a
structure of petty proprietorship and traditional patterns
of exploitation which in the long run blocked rural transformation were maintained.20

V
Immanuel Wallerstein's Modern World-System belongs to the
latter strategy, for it involves a reformulation of the
transition problem. It should be said at once that the
book is the most ambitious attempt yet to explain the
transition by recasting the terms of the debate. Wallerstein contends that capitalism emerged only because both
political and economic structures were transformed, and
therefore he has much of interest to say about the reciprocal influences of economy and politics in a wide
range of countries. In his interpretation, political
development and economic development—or the lack of both
—had to go hand in hand; one was not conceivable without
the other. And in his central reformulation (from which
the work takes its title), Wallerstein maintains that the
transition occurred outside as well as within conventional
frameworks, and he attempts to overcome the parochialism
which often characterized the earlier debate. Apart from
these considerable virtues of audacity and scope, the book
is based on wide reading in the secondary literature, sets
out at length its reasoning and (usually) its judgments,
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and has a refreshingly undogmatic, even chatty, tone
it
has extensive footnotes and a most useful bibliography in
the original edition, although the new paperback version
eliminates them. In short, it is impossible to read the
book and not be greatly stimulated by it.
Because the analysis is so extensive, it needs to be sketched
out before being critically discussed. Wallerstein begins
by defining what he means by a world system, which he differentiates from an empire. It is "an economic but not a political entity, ... larger than any juridically defined political unit," in which "the basic linkage between the parts
of the system" is economic, later reinforced by cultural and
political relationships (p. 15). Since there is no overarching political structure to maintain, the world-system
is cheaper and more efficient than an empire, not to mention
more flexible in responding to and benefitting from new
initiatives.^1 Moreover, the world-system has to be organized capitalistically, for unlike feudalism, in which as we
have seen the surplus is appropriated by political means,
capitalism uses market mechanisms for that purpose and the
world-system is, more than anything else, a market. Wallerstein hastens to point out that state machinery is of course
necessary to establish and sustain a market situation which
redounds to the advantage of only a few of its participants,
but the role of the state is normally indirect and economic
relations function on their own.
Although the entire world-system is capitalist, three divisions can be distinguished within it—core, periphery and
semiperiphery—each differing from the others accordino to
economic, political, social and cultural factors. According to Wallerstein, such a system could only arise after
the general crisis of fedualism in the later Middle Ages.
Following Dobb and Hilton, he defines this as a period of
long-term structural crisis due to rising political and
social costs of an expanding ruling class which, because
not accompanied by any increase in productivity, placed a
greater burden on the peasantry and eventuated in generalized class war. But he goes further in spelling out why
the troubles which led to the simultaneous collapse and
rebuilding of feudalism in different parts of Europe broke
out when they did, noting short-term or conjunctural problems: a cyclical crisis and climatological shift reinforced
the effects of the deeper-rooted difficulties.
Drawing largely on the Polish scholar Marian Malowist,
Wallerstein claims that European elites were able to
resolve the ruinous conflicts at home in such a way as
to perpetuate their political hegemony (and, as an entirely unforeseen consequence, open the way for the new
world-system); this was accomplished by territorial and

25
commercial expansion, which greatly increased the amount of
population and land for Europe to exploit. A further dynamic
factor in the feudal crisis and in its resolution was the
growth of the central state, hastened by the weakening of
individual lords (who themselves wanted more protection than
their own resources could provide), changes in the art of
war, and increases in tax monies which allowed bureaucracies
and mercenaries to be hired. States consolidated these initial advantages by the creation of legitimacy—in the form
of an ideology which Wallerstein calls "statism" (a nice
refinement of the overworked and, for the sixteenth century,
incorrect term "nationalism")--and by the homogenization of
the home population, achieved by expelling ethnic and religious minorities. Thus a powerful dialectic was set up
within the maturing core states: monarchs wanting to restore
order realized that they had to promote economic growth in
order to finance their states, while the rise of strong
government was an inescapable prerequisite to the genesis
of capitalism, for it provided a resilient framework in
which class formation with its inevitable conflict could
occur without derailing economic development.
The specific agent setting in motion the forces which
eventually brought into existence the capitalist worldeconomy was, however, neither located in the central area
of feudalism nor was it one of the main beneficiaries of
the new system. Rather, a special case—Portugal—opened
the era of exploration and thereby showed the way to solve
the feudal crisis. Portugal already had what the other
states would acquire in the process of transition—a strong
state, a monetized economy and relatively urbanized population, plenty of capital, a vigorous mercantile class whose
self-interest converged with that of the nobility—plus a
favorable geographical position, and these were deployed
to advantage. As a result of the initial Portuguese
voyages and Spanish emulation, Europe was supplied with raw
materials, food, bullion—and an equilibrating outlet for
internal tensions.
By means of conquest or, as in eastern Europe, commercial
penetration, the area subject to western European economic
or political control, or both, was enormously enlarged by
the sixteenth century. But this circumstance led to a
fundamental transformation only because this entire new
"world" was organized in such a way that economic flows
benefitted some parts more than others, thereby permitting
the unequal accumulation of wealth necessary for economic
development. Hence, too, political organisms of varying
power evolved in the different regions of the world-economy:
not all of equal strength, as that would block the inequitable distribution of economic goods required for capitalism, nor all of equal weakness, as in that case the new
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capitalist classes would lack sufficient protections to
allow them to carry out their entrepreneurial role. Yet
it was not to happen that those states which had carried
out political conquest would gain the upper hand and largest share; as the case of China indicated, empires involved
too many overheads which impeded growth. Portugal and Spain,
in other words, would do the dirty work, get the glory—and
forego the ultimate profits. Thus a new form of economic
dominance matured. It was based partly on a new "world
market mechanism" centered in England, the Low Countries,
western Germany and northern France, reinforced by the
effects of the secular inflation of the sixteenth century,
which forced capital accumulation by the uneven reallocation of profits into that same segment of northwest Europe.
More important to the organization of new economic relations
was an emerging worldwide division of labor. This slowly
articulated the world-economy into three parts—core, semiperiphery and periphery—in each of which different types
of labor control, economic specialization and state structure obtained. Coterminous with northwest Europe, the
core had the strongest states, able to keep order and defend the economy, but not so powerful as to interfere with
economic development by the pursuit of economically nonfunctional goals which simply led to burdensome tasks.
Whatever the variations from one to another, the core
states had in common a greater degree of strength as compared with the other areas, as a result of which the former
got a disproportionate share of the surplus generated by
the entire world-system. The core also specialized in
skilled and high-profit uses of labor (crafts and industry,
pastoral activities, the raising of certain lucrative
crops) and employed the loosest, cheapest and most efficient kinds of labor control available—wage labor and
peasant proprietorship. The reason for this state of affairs, Wallerstein contends, is not to be found in peasant
resistance, although he does not make clear why he rejects
this explanation (see his puzzling remarks on p. 104). Instead, he points to a high density of population resulting
in cheap labor, the relative strength of towns, and the
evolving world market, which enforced a division of labor
and terms of trade which proved advantageous for west
European peasants and capitalists alike.
In the semiperiphery (never precisely defined, but apparently including the Iberian peninsula, southern France,
northern Italy, southern Germany), states were feebler,
a process of deindustrialization and return to agrarian
self-sufficiency was occurring, and sharecropping—a sort
of second-best way of minimizing risks in a period of
inflation—was adopted. In this segment—substantially
the Hapsburg empire of Charles V and his successors—
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monarchs chased after imperial dreams, thus getting in the
way of nascent capitalism, for which they could open the way
and pay the costs but not reap the rewards.
Finally, in the periphery governments were extremely weak,
often no more than adjuncts of west European regimes, whose
interests they served either under direct compulsion or due
to the workings of the world market. Though this arrangement
bolstered the narrow political elite of the peripheral lands,
it spelled ever-growing misery for the mass of the population.
This area provided bullion for the money and capital western
Europe needed, as well as exotic foods and materials (Latin
America) and bulky raw materials and grain (eastern Europe),
all of which allowed more remunerative specialization in the
core.22 For this to be possible, of course, these commodities
had to be produced cheaply by means of unskilled labor power.
Hence harsh methods of organization were required, whether
slavery or serfdom, which together Wallerstein calls "coerced
cash-crop labor."23
As even this bare summary indicates, Wallerstein's book provides a provocative thesis with which to interpret the transition. It attempts to give theoretical as well as historical content to Marx's comment (Capital, I, ch. IV) that "The
modern history of capital dates from the creation in the
sixteenth century of a world-embracing commerce and a worldembracing market." Synthesizing earlier work, Wallerstein
presents a nuanced view of feudalism, describing how trade
was intrinsic to it, and of its final crisis. Even more
than Dobb, he stresses the many differences as well as the
similarities in capitalist economic development. Likewise,
his treatment of the evolution of the state in western
Europe during the transition goes well beyond anything in
the earlier literature.
Notwithstanding these accomplishments, the work has a number
of deficiencies. Some are to be expected in light of its
impressive reach, and affect only matters of detail and
emphasis. But there are several which strike at the heart
of its argument and which therefore deserve to be examined
at some length: the categories Wallerstein employs, his
definition of capitalism, and a strongly ahistorical tendency in the book's thesis and presentation. In each of
these closely linked cases, there are problems both with
the basic conception and with the fit between the theoretical framework and the data marshalled in support of it.
Very likely this difficulty in pinning down the proof of
the points advanced in the book is what makes reading it
so often frustrating.
1. Categories. Although it has a certain elegance as a
hypothesis, the tripartite model of the world-economy does
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not work very well. The importance of the dialectic between
development and underdevelopment in capitalism, first noted
by Marx and elaborated by Andre Gunder Frank (on whom Wallerstein draws), has been well documented. The phenomenon was
not, indeed, limited to relations between emerging capitalist
nations and colonized areas. Even within the capitalist land
a trend towards specialization originated at least as early
as the sixteenth century, with the result that each ended up
by reproducing domestically the overall pattern of advanced
and backward areas. But if the interdependence of periphery
(no matter where located geographically) and core in the
capitalist economy can be accepted as proven, its application
by Wallerstein to the historical material cannot be endorsed
without significant exception. The formation of advanced
and backward regions was not, to begin with, simply a function of the world-system, being found within the capitalist
core as well as between it and the periphery. Perhaps this
fact explains why the world-system is invoked in this book
as both cause and effect of the emerging worldwide division
of labor. Nor was the trend to specialization very far
advanced in the sixteenth century: even the periphery remained largely outside the world-system and contributed more
supply than demand.
Further, the discussion of the core itself is confusing. As
it stands, this area includes a number of lands at the end
of the Middle Ages (most of northwest Europe and even some
of Germany and Italy) but only England by the later seventeenth century. While this corresponds with the history of
capitalism, just England and to a lesser degree France get
much attention for their success and near-miss respectively;
the other areas simply disappear. This is rather surprising,
given Wallerstein's stress elsewhere on the significance of
the Netherlands. But instead of an explanation for the
Netherlands' failure to remain one of the core states, we
are merely told that she eventually got pushed out of the
market (p. 214), something which appears to be more a
result than a cause of other developments. Even less is
indicated about the fate of the other regions. Hence the
potentially exciting subject of the formation of a capitalist core in western Europe comes down to the old topic
of why England became the first capitalist nation even
though France had seemed the most likely candidate. And
as we shall see, the explication offered—success in
dominating the world market—is unsatisfactory. In any case,
the discussion of the core needs to be broadened, to make
provision for a greater variety of outcomes and for the
stages of the transition which would explain these results.
After all, capitalism was built in different ways and at
different rates of speed.
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Wallerstein's refinement of the core-periphery model is,
moreover, open to serious objection, for the notion of the
semiperiphery which he introduces is unpersuasive both conceptually and empirically. It works neither as an analytic
nor as a descriptive category. Basically, he assigns the
semipheriphery the task of providing a dynamic dimension to
the rather static core-periphery polarization (which once
it is insituted in the sixteenth century continues right up
to the present) without having recourse to the idea of
stages or phases of development: the semiperiphery is made
up of rising former peripheral areas and declining core
states. Despite disclaimers (pp. 349-50), the semiperiphery seems little more than a post-hoc catch-all for odd
cases, especially those disconcerting parts of Europe which
did not break through to capitalism although they had capital, skills and industry (Italy), or land and labor (Spain),
or all of these and more (Portugal). Creating this sort of
holding basin serves, however, to obscure not illuminate
the internal dynamics of the world-system.
Nor is any other function of the semiperiphery advanced by
Wallerstein convincing. He further defines it as a mediator,
where "vital skills that are often politically unpopular"
were collected (p. 350). Even if we overlook the vagueness
of this explanation, are we really to believe that entrepreneurship and business skills, which were matured in
semiperipheral Italy, were actually politically unpopular
in the Netherlands? Or that state-formation, which the
Spanish government pursued relentlessly, was not also to the
taste of that Henry VIII who referred to himself as "emperor
in his own realm"? Similarly, it is hard to understand the
place of the semiperiphery in the international division
of labor. Its separate conceptual existence could be justified if it had a special role. Yet if, as Wallerstein
claims, it were actually taking the route of deindustrialization and agrarian self-sufficiency, it was economically
external to the world-economy; if not, it was providing
core and/or peripheral goods and services and need not be
treated separately.
Other evidence also indicates the incoherent nature of the
semiperiphery. For one thing, the units within it were extremely heterogeneous—which is perhaps why we never get a
concrete definition of what composed it: parts of France
and Germany, Italy, Spain, presumably Portugal. Then, too,
it is by no means plain that all the places Wallerstein
puts in the semiperiphery were turning to self-sufficiency.
Not only were there large capitalist farms throughout, but
sharecropping itself was capitalistic, as at least one of
Wallerstein's authorities remarks (see p. 107, n. 148), and
was not limited to semiperipheral regions (see p. 105,
n. 141).
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In dealing with France, that hybrid of core and semiperiphery,
the problems with the latter emerge directly. By pointing to
her schizophrenia--a state at once too strong and too weak,
an orientation to land and to sea, and so forth--Wallerstein
reminds us of the curious blend of immobilism and action
which was the French absolutist state. However, these contradictions within France had little to do with emerging
semiperipheral factors; instead, they resulted from the continued regionalism of economic and political structures, a
point which even Wallerstein comes close to conceding (see
p. 294). Regional disparities were emphasized by the unequal development inherent in capitalism, but they had prior
causes; besides, internal variations were powerfully reinforced by popular movements all across the late medieval
and early modern periods, ranging from peasant risings to
less dramatic action in town and country. Since Wallerstein
regards these as results of France's position rather than
as central causes, he ends up explaining hybrid and vacillating behavior as a result of its hybrid and vacillating
position in the world-economy. Unfortunately, this sort
of circular argument functions no better here than in regard to the formation of the world-system and its division
of labor. Finally, the areas of southern France which
Wallerstein treats as semiperipheral from an economic point
of view turn out to be the allies of core provinces on the
Atlantic coast when political movements are discussed. In
the case of France, semiperiphery serves no explanatory
purpose; it just confuses the issue.
It might be thought that a better case could be made for
semiperiphery if it were restricted to the Hapsburg territories. Yet even here it is both distorting and superfluous. For one thing, in important parts of that territory capitalism did in fact flourish: not only in the
Rhineland but also in Catalonia, as Pierre Vilar has shown.
In addition, Wallerstein himself focuses on the Hapsburg
lands as demonstrating how political factors—in the event,
imperial "overextension"—could undermine economic development. Like France, therefore, much of Spain, Italy and
Germany (not to mention Portugal and the Netherlands), can
more sensibly be discussed as countries which despite
numerous advantages were unable to complete the transition.
Such an explanantion would avoid the logical dilemma of
using position in the world-system to account for position
in the world-system, as Wallerstein is repeatedly forced to
do in order to make his theory work. It would as well incorporate dynamic elements directly into the core-periphery
dialectic, both in terms of the evolution of capitalism
(something Wallerstein ignores) and in terms of the regional
variations which were endemic throughout Europe before and
after the transition or its failure. On the whole, then,
the semiperiphery is unnecessary; in terms of economic

31
development, political organization and social structure, its
constituent parts were rather strata of the two basic structural components of the world-system than a separate class.
2. Definition of Capitalism. Wallerstein's account of the
origins of the "world-embracing" market which Marx had remarked on is also disappointing. His interpretation of the
history of overseas expansion is in the end puzzling, fascinating as his explanation of many individual features is.
Portugal, we are told, led off because she had largely surmounted her feudal crisis and therefore enjoyed distinctive
attributes. However, the central reasons adduced for her
voyaging seem contingent (need for spices, Genoese capital)
or fortuitous (geographic position, internal class harmony),
while Europe's problems were structural, rooted in the mode
of production. In short, as Wallerstein himself admits
(p. 48), it is difficult to link the circumstances of Portuguese exploration with Europe's general crisis. To put
it another way, there is no real reason why Portugal should
have ventured forth in order to solve those European problems she did not have. It is also hard to understand why
Spain rather than another country followed and then replaced
Portugal in expansion, since Spain does not seem to have met
the criteria for success in this endeavor—social solidarity
at home and the ability to use distant cheap labor (p. 8 6 ) —
any better than anyone else. In The Modern World System,
expansion functions as a deus ex machina.
But Wallerstein's emphasis on the vast growth of the European-centered economic system does not derive simply from
his reading of the history of exploration and therefore
cannot be refuted just by showing the incoherence of this
part of his account. He asserts as well that expansion
promoted a new pattern of specialization and new forms of
labor control which assured that the surplus flowed mainly
into the core. While booty was of some consequence in this
process, the crucial factor was a sharp rise in prices during the sixteenth century, the effect of an influx of gold
and silver from the New World "in the context of a capitalist world-economy..." (p. 74). Together with a related
wage lag, inflation distributed income inequitably, forcing
savings and thus investment.
Although the phenomena he describes were both real and
important, Wallerstein*s explanation and application of
them is unconvincing. First, he relies heavily (though
somewhat unclearly) on the work of the economic historian
Earl Hamilton, whose data as well as conclusions have been
largely modified, when not rejected, by later research.24
Moreover, once again Wallerstein begs the question by assuming the existence of a capitalist world-system when he
is trying to discover its origins. Further, we are never

32
shown whether the wealth generated was in fact either transferred from some groups and parts of the world-economy to
others. Most important, the information he presents (see
pp. 69-84, especially Table I) strongly suggests that bullion was of minor significance in setting off inflation.
Rather, it was rising economic activity in the context of
the expropriation of direct producers who were forced into
the market which explains both inflation and the fall in
wages. Bullion could have effects, in other words, only
because the artisans and peasants of Europe were being
dispossessed. In short, Wallerstein focuses on the gathering of money,while neglecting the process of primitive
accumulation which alone reveals how the conditions developed which permitted money to function as capital.
The difficulties with Wallerstein's exposition of the genesis
of capitalism arise in part from his interpretation of the
historical material. Over and above this, they come from his
understanding of capitalism. As we have seen, capitalism is
a unique system of production and appropriation of the surplus produced. It is not, as Marx long ago pointed out (and
Dobb patiently restated in chapter 1 of Studies), a system
of exchange, even though the circulation of commodities is
intrinsic to it. For Wallerstein, however, what matters
are market regulations. Repeating and defending Gunder
Frank, he sees "capitalism as production for market in which
the profit does not go to the direct producer..." (p. 126).
There is no doubt that the market is important in the evolution and structure of capitalism. It promotes the development of productive forces as well as differentiation among
producers, thereby permitting the continued reproduction of
capitalist relations. It is the place where labor power
is purchased, where other commodities ciculate, and where
surplus value is realized and then appropriated to the
advantage of one class and the detriment of another. Its
workings augment the amount of money available for investment, as is evident from the fact that merchants were among
the first to accumulate and deploy capital on a large scale.
But if the market can do all this, it alone cannot begin the
process of bringing capitalism into existence, as we have
seen. After all, the exchange of commodities existed under
feudalism; while the volume of exchanges increases under
capitalism, the capitalist market is not a new development
in the sense that capitalist production is, as is clear
when we recall that the "commercial revolution" occurred
during the High Middle Ages. 2 5 Moreover, since medieval
trade yielded high profits (and thus an unequal accumulation of capital) to the lands of the Mediterranean and
further east without engendering capitalism, we should be
wary of attributing too much weight to this mechanism in
early modern western Europe.
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In any case, the markets which mattered to the sustenance of
early capitalist development were less those newly opened by
recent exploration and settlement than those within western
Europe. De Vries' study of Holland reveals that agrarian
reorganization was a function not of distant world but of
nearby markets. Economic growth ensued because of regional
specialization and rationalization, not to mention changes
within village and family structure. In the case of England,
too, the trade patterns which fostered rural industry and
capitalist agriculture were interregional or with the Continent; they had little to do with the new world market until
well into the seventeenth century. Even the evidence cited
by Wallerstein supports the point that it was not the recently-opened areas of the world which helped English commerce and industry grow, but the old.26
While as Wallerstein notes (p. 129), Marx did write that "the
capitalistic era dates from the sicteenth century" (Capital,
I, ch. XXVI), this was not done to demonstrate the existence
of a world-economy. Instead, the assertion was made in the
context of a discussion of original accumulation, which
forced people to enter the market, to produce for it and to
buy in it. Wallerstein rightly sees the market as a place
for amassing capital, but he disregards those aspects which
were equally central to capitalism: the enforced sale of
labor power and the circulation of commodities made under
the new relations of production.
Once it is grasped that the results of primitive accumulation
created the world market rather than the other way around,
it becomes possible to make sense of two related matters
which are confused in Wallerstein's presentation. First,
the fact that territorial and commercial expansion during
the sixteenth century—unlike that which had occurred in
the ninth and tenth and again in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries—did not revitalize feudalism but marked its demise. Second, his treatment of the second serfdom in the
East as an offshoot of trade, despite evidence that the
market led to the abolition of serfdom in many places. 27 In
short, as these and other examples indicate—Spain's abortive
development is a particularly outstanding instance—the market was a variable which had different effects depending
on what Marx called the "internal articulation" of the existing economic structure.
To be sure, Wallerstein is aware that a labor force is required by any mode of production; one of his central--and
most interesting—theses concerns the several forms of control devised under capitalism to manaqe labor. In order
to explain these differences, he relies on demography.
Thus a higher density of population in the core countries
led to greater specialization and productivity, which in
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turn meant workers were more amenable to market discipline
and required less coercion than in the less populous periphery and semiperiphery. This reasoning seems, however, to
undercut his argument about the effects of the expanded market: if demographic factors affected economic evolution even
before the world-system came into existence, then the latter
seems to serve no explanatory purpose. Aside from this, emphasis on population underplays the role of social conflict
not only in bringing about change but in determining relations of production, which at bottom is what labor control
is all about. Wallerstein explains commu tation of feudal
dues to money rents during the crisis of the later Middle
Ages in terms of population decline rather than class
struggle. Or, as he puts his general conclusion about
variations in forms of labor control, "The difference [in
types of labor regimentation] was less in the peasant's
alternatives, though this played a role, than in the landowner's alternatives" (p. 111). Most important of all, a
stress on population movements can explain quantitative
change within a given structure, as the monographs of the
Annales school have shown, but only an explication of the
way contradictions within a mode of production were worked
out can account for its supercession.
Attention must be given, that is to say, to the interplay
between changing market forces and the conflicts within the
existing socio-economic structure. Then several of the
intriguing but unanswered questions raised at least implicitly by Wallerstein's book could be resolved. For
example, why did Portugal not develop capitalistically,
endowed as she was with a strong but not oppressive state,
cooperating bourgeoisie and nobility, a relatively high
degree of urbanization, plentiful but not disorderly semiproletariat, a lot of capital, and first position in the
scramble? An even more notable anomaly which could be
cleared up is that the countries in which the feudal crisis
was strongest—e.g., England and France—did not get into
the business of expansion for a long time after the Iberian
nations had shown the way. England and France, of course,
were also the countries which later formed the capitalist
core.
Pace Wallerstein, then, there is no proof that it was a
market capitalism born of commercial and demographic expansion which allowed Europe to get out of "decimation
and stagnation." On the contrary, it seems that capitalism only developed where "old" and "new" forces had no
choice but to contend with one another until the latter
won out. In England, class struggle continued until the
victory of proto-capitalist landlords and entrepreneurs;
in France, strife continued as a result of social deadlock; in Spain, feudal groups won. Initial deep
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involvement in the emerging world-system was a hindrance to
economic progress rather than a help. Those areas which actually had subjected parts of the periphery which they could
exploit did not evolve in a capitalist direction because they
were not thrust in upon themselves and forced to. If expansion were a viable option, the struggle at home was decided
in favor of the dominant feudal groups, but economic transformation was precluded.
3. Ahistorical Theory and Presentation. In order to incorporate the dialectic between the market and social relations
into his explanation of the rise of capitalism, Wallerstein
would have to do more than pay closer attention to the productive aspect of the economy, to the contradictions born
within it and to the structure and evolution of commodity
production. Aided by the growing corpus of detailed local
studies, which are for the most part ignored in The Modern
World-System, he would have to cast his investigation in
historical terms. This means first of all recognizing that
capitalism and its core-periphery dichotomy were historical
developments which had barely begun in the early modern
period. At that time, most of both areas was entirely
outside of the still-rudimentary world system and not subject to its exigencies. Even in those portions which were
affected by new economic conditions, traditional modes of
production, classes and forms of behavior persisted for
centuries.
Just as it has been shown that treating feudalism as a monolith makes it impossible to comprehend its adaptations and
collapse, so capitalism cannot be understood if its evolving
phases are overlooked. Specifically, an early mercantile
stage needs to be distinguished from a later industrial one.
In the first—which is in fact the subject of Wallerstein's
book--capital played a much larger role than before; however, neither the relations nor the forces of production
had changed much. Even though they increasingly set the
terms, merchants still bought from petty producers, who on
their side continued to work in the old ways and enjoyed
many traditional privileges and protections. Even artisanrun workships were small and required the physical labor of
the owner if they were to provide him a living. This phase
was transitional in the truest sense of the word: economic
development could and did go forward and back. Capitalism's
victory was not assured anywhere.
If anything else, his reading of the transition debate should
have indicated to Wallerstein that while the system he outlines was not feudal, neither was it yet capitalist. Unfortunately, the static way in which he regards economic formations causes him to miss the opportunity to redefine the
transition in a manner which would go beyond the either-or
terms of earlier contributions.
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Were Wallerstein's explication historical--if, in other words,
it interpreted the economic structure of the sixteenth century
for what it was (a transitional term) rather than for what it
might become (a fully developed mode of production)--a number
of outstanding issues could begin to be elucidated. Take the
surprising economic history of the Netherlands, which showed
a type of evolution within the early core states which fell
short of self-sustaining industrial capitalism. Even with a
strong but flexible state in which the bourgeoisie was hegemonic, nearly free access to the empires created by the
Iberian nations, first-rate technique, among many other advantages, the Netherlands only rose to temporary commercial
predominance: it did not complete the economic transformation
until much later. Besides throwing light oh this and other
examples of commercial growth without capitalist development,
an historical interpretation could suggest answers to the
many remaining questions about labor organization. For example, the core employed both wage labor and peasant proprietorship. Yet these are very different forms of labor
organization, and accounting for their success (vide Brenner) goes a long way towards solving the puzzle of why.Britain
took off first and France stumbled. Then, too, the way that
eastern Europe was incorporated into the periphery might be
rescued from the logical and historical circularity to which
Wallerstein has consigned it. As he tells the story, the
outcome seems to depend on the existence of the world economy
and its division of labor, to the building of which, however,
eastern Europe's coerced cash-crop labor was a primary contributor. Finally, the insuperable confusion engendered by
the concept of the semiperiphery would vanish if its component parts were seen not as part of a system which was
completely articulated from its day of birth but as going
thorugh stages--whether progressive or regressive—of the
transition.
Greater regard to both the historical dimension and the
inner dynamics of the transition would illuminate its political context. The formation of strong national states
and economic development is a point on which Wallerstein
understandably lays great stress: "The capitalist worldeconomy seems to have required and facilitated this secular
process of increased centralization and internal control,
at least within the core states" (p. 136). Upon consideration, however, the validity of this insight is not at all
apparent, and in fact the entire discussion of the relationship between economic and political evolution is most
inadequate. At root, of course, the arqument is circular:
economic growth was required for the emergence of a strong
state machinery, which in turn was necessary if capitalism
were to arise. Even if we disregard this recurrent logical
problem, empirical ones remain. Except for h o m o g e m ? a t i o n
of population, the features of the new state spelled out in
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chapter 3 are not made specific to particular states. All
we know is that "some kings" implemented them. Moreover, the
state-building described does not fit merely, or even best,
the core countries. It applies to Spain, some of the Italian
princedoms, and parts of Germany as well as to England and
France, and better to all of them than to the Netherlands.
Furthermore, it was not. the case that Waller stein' s core
states were the strongest either internationally or in the
face of internal opposition, his criteria for a powerful
state (p. 355). Indeed, as he elsewhere suggests, England
and the Netherlands had governments which were not so forceful or expensive as to thwart economic development, though
otherwise they were extremely different, It should also be
remembered that in England prolonged revolution broke out.
The most disappointing aspect of this part of his discussion
is Wallerstein's narrow view of early modern politics. To
be sure, the activities of monarchs and established landed
elites were important, but they were only half the dialectic.
Regarding politics from the top down, as in this book, implie
that policies finally implemented derived from well-planned
rational decisions, thereby distorting the interaction of
historical forces, notably class struggle, by ignoring them.
To take just one instance: due to his concentration on the
nobility and its concerns, Wallerstein overlooks the central
dynamic of the Netherlands Revolution, the vacillating behavior of the various strata of the bourgeoisie and artisans. 28 A S a further consequence of his restrictive notion
of politics, the significance of the new Dutch republic for
European economic and political development'is disregarded
or, rather, relegated to a quotation in a footnote. In this
book, discussion of "state-building" substitutes for political analysis.
The scope of Wallerstein's inquiry is broader, but in the
end his treatment of the genesis of capitalism gets us no
further than Dobb and the earlier transition debate. Indeed, Wallerstein's explanation of the issues of peasant
struggle, petty commodity production, urban-rural relations,
and primitive accumulation is inferior to the level achieved
in previous contributions. He discusses the final crisis
of feudalism, but since he wants to define the rise of a
world-system, not a mode of production, he addresses himself
not to contradictions but to trade, to demography, to the
calculating behavior of the political elite. His mentor
is not Karl Marx, the student of class struggle, but Fernand
Braudel, the Annales-school patriarch of biologically and
geographically determined modernization.
What Wallerstein has done is to describe the formation of a
greatly enlarged trading unit; he shows the transition from
one market system to another. Hence the importance of Amsterdam: not because it had any effect on expansion, labor
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control, or state formation, but because it served as the
center of world trade. Yet as the rapid elimination of
Amsterdam (or, for that matter, Antwerp) from the leading
position showed, being the keystone of even the biggest
commercial arena meant little when not backed up by domestic structural change. The world system outlined by
Wallerstein was a commercial network, more sizeable than
but not yet fundamentally different from earlier world systems found around the Mediterranean and in northern Europe.
Eventually, it was transformed into a capitalist economy
firmly dominated by a small number of western European
nations. But while the system created the periphery and
its peculiar relations with the core, it did not create
capitalism in the core states. That was the result of the
interaction between the market and internal developments.
The modern capitalist world-system was the child not the
parent of European capitalism.
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